Abstract This is a sequel to two previous papers, where it was shown that, for the Heyting propositional calculus H, we can give Kripke-style models whose accessibility relation R need not be a quasi-ordering relation, provided we have:
The standard conception of Kripke models for Heyting's logic is based on the following assumptions:
(I) valuations must be defined inductively, starting from atomic formulas; (II) the accessibility relation R must be at least a quasi-ordering relation, i.e., it must be reflexive and transitive; (III) heredity must be satisfied, in the sense that if a formula A holds at a point x of a model, which we write x E v(A) 9 then Vy(xRy => y E
v(A)).
In [2] and [3] , one can find the beginning of an investigation of Kripke-style models for Heyting's logic where these assumptions are changed in various ways and the following is established. First, if we reject (I), we also may reject (II), and get models where R must be only serial (i.e., Vxly(xRy)), provided we have assumed in addition to (III) the following converse heredity condition:
Vy(xRy=>y£ v(A)) =>Λ:E V(A).
This condition is trivially satisfied if R is reflexive, but our R need not be reflexive any more. The resulting models, with respect to which we have strong soundness and completeness of the Heyting propositional calculus, were called rudimentary Kripke models.
Even if we keep (I), but work with both heredity and converse heredity, (II) is not necessary. Instead of a quasi-ordering, we will have a more general, and somewhat more involved, type of ordering. The resulting models, with respect to which we have again strong soundness and completeness of the Heyting propositional calculus, were called inductive Kripke models. In all that, the conditions for valuations, and in particular the clauses concerning connectives, are as in the standard conception. We have only introduced converse heredity, which is anyway satisfied in standard Kripke models.
In this paper, we repeat the pattern of these changes with a condition that is in a certain sense dual to converse heredity. Heredity may alternatively be written as:
ly(yRx &ye v(A)) => x E v(A),
and our dual condition, which we call ancestrality, is the converse implication:
xE v(A) => ly(yRx &yG v(A)).
This condition is trivially satisfied if R is reflexive, but, as before, our R need not be reflexive.
If we reject (I), we also may reject (II), provided we have assumed heredity and ancestrality. We call the resulting models ancestral Kripke models. These models make a proper subclass of rudimentary Kripke models, and, in them, both R and the inverse relation must be serial. Nothing else need be assumed about R.
Next, even if we keep (I), but work with heredity and ancestrality, (II) is again not necessary, and we get analogs of inductive Kripke models that we call inductive ancestral Kripke models. As before, the conditions for valuations, and, in particular, the clauses concerning connectives, are as in the standard concep-tion. We have only introduced ancestrality, which is anyway satisfied in standard Kripke models.
In the first section, we investigate ancestral Kripke models in general, and obtain strong soundness and completeness of the Heyting propositional calculus with respect to these models as a corollary of results of [2] . In the second section, we investigate inductive ancestral Kripke models.
In the third section, we make another type of change. We reject (III), as well as all other similar conditions, like converse heredity and ancestrality. This will entail a change in the standard conditions for valuations concerning connectives, which up to now we did not touch. We call the resulting models nonhereditary Kripke models. With nonhereditary Kripke models, for questions we consider, it is not interesting whether (I) is kept or not, because there is nothing like heredity that our inductively defined valuations must inherit from atomic formulas. It may be more interesting to see whether (II) must be kept. With our main notion of nonhereditary Kripke model, which seems to be the simplest one could think of, it must. With another notion of nonhereditary Kripke model, briefly envisaged at the end, (II) can be replaced by a somewhat more general assumption.
As ordinary Kripke models for Heyting's logic are related to an embedding of Heyting's logic into the modal logic 54, so nonhereditary Kripke models are related to some particular embeddings of Heyting's logic into S4 and a somewhat weaker normal modal logic. We shall see that some, but not every, form of strong soundness and completeness can be established for the Heyting propositional calculus with respect to our main notion of nonhereditary Kripke model. With respect to the notion where (II) is rejected, we will obtain only the ordinary soundness and completeness.
The various types of Kripke-style models investigated in [2] , [3] , and here are meant to be primarily an instrument for the analysis of the inner mechanism of Kripke models. We do not propose rudimentary Kripke models as something to replace standard Kripke models for the technical investigation of Heyting's logic. For the time being, we want these new models to be only an instrument that will help us to understand better the standard models.
It is not clear whether our new Kripke-style models also have a philosophical significance. Our intuition cannot remain the same if valuations are not defined inductively, or if the accessibility relation is not reflexive and transitive, or if heredity is not satisfied, or if the semantic clauses for connectives are changed. However, our aim is not to work for a single new intuition to replace the old one. It is rather an attempt to delimit a field within which we can look for new models without ever leaving standard Kripke models too far behind.
Kripke models for intuitionistic logic are often taken as a paradigm when we try to model other nonclassical logics. So, it might be worth knowing all the possibilities inherent in this paradigm, lest we should be stranded by a too narrow imitation of features that are perhaps accidental. (In [4] one can find models for logics based on weak implications, like relevant and linear implication, that are in some respect analogous to rudimentary Kripke models.) This paper is a sequel to [2] and [3] , and a full understanding of a number of things we want to say here presupposes an acquaintance with these earlier papers, especially [2] . However, we shall try to make this paper as self-contained as possible, short of repeating rather straightforward things. For some basic results (for example, soundness with respect to rudimentary Kripke models), we must rely on [2] or on the acuity of the reader. As in the earlier papers, we concentrate on propositional logic and leave aside a possible extension of our approach to predicate logic.
/ Ancestral Kripke models
Our propositional language has infinitely many propositional variables, the binary connectives -», Λ, and v, and the propositional constant _L. We use the following metavariables, i.e. schematic letters:
propositional variables: p 9 q 9 r 9 ... formulas:
A 9 B 9 C 9 ... sets of formulas: Γ, Δ, θ,... possibly with subscripts or superscripts. As usual, A++B is defined as {A -+B) A (B->A) 9 and -*A as A -• JL. The set of all formulas is called L. In the metalanguage, we use =>, «=>, &, or, not, V, 3, and set-theoretical symbols with the usual meaning they have in classical logic.
The Heyting propositional calculus H in L is axiomatized by the following usual axiom-schemata: Cone inv^= {x:3y(xR*y &yeX)}.
In this section, we use only Cone 1 and Cone" 1 , whereas Cone and Cone inv , which are closure operations (see [10] , Chap. I, §8) will be used in the next section.
For every X^ W 9 let -Xbe W -X, i.e. the complement of X with respect to W. A set Xis hereditary iff X c -Cone" 1 -X, i.e., for every x:
xGX=> Vy(xRy^yEX).
A set X is conversely hereditary iff -Cone" 1 -X <Ξ X 9 i.e., for every x:
It is easy to verify that X is hereditary iff Cone 1 X Q X, i.e., for every x:
A set X is ancestral iff JΓ £Ξ Cone 1 X, i.e., for every x: xGX=> 3y(yRx&yeX).
Note that, if R is reflexive, every X is conversely hereditary and ancestral. A hereditary and conversely hereditary X satisfies for every x:
x G X<* Vy(xRy => y G X), whereas a hereditary and ancestral X satisfies for every x:
x G X& 3y(yRx &yGX).
Note that the first equivalence is analogous to the schema:
which can serve to axiomatize equality in the predicate calculus, whereas the second equivalence is analogous to the schema:
which can also serve to axiomatize equality in the predicate calculus (cf. [5] , §6). A pseudo-valuation i ona frame < W, R) is a function from L into PW that satisfies the following conditions for every A,B E L:
We use X -+ R Yas an abbreviation for -Cone" 1 -(-X U Y); i.e., -+ R is the binary operation involved in (f->). The conditions (v-+) 9 (VA) 9 (VV), and (v±) are exactly like the usual semantic clauses for connectives in Kripke models for Heyting's logic.
A valuation υ on a frame (W,R) is a pseudo-valuation that satisfies: Consider now the following condition:
C4-Ancestrality) for every formula A, the set v(A) is ancestral, for which we can easily prove:
Proposition 1 Every pseudo-valuation that satisfies A-Ancestrality satisfies Converse A-Heredity.

Proof: Suppose the pseudo-valuation υ on (W,R) satisfies yl-Ancestrality, and suppose Vy(xRy ^y G v(A)). It follows that *G v((B-+B) -+A). Then, by AAncestrality, we have 3y(yRx & y G v((B -> B) -• A)), which implies ly(yRx & Vu(yRu => u G t>(^4)))> and this implies x G t>(^4).
So, every pseudo-valuation that satisfies A -Heredity and ^4-Ancestrality is a valuation. We shall call such valuations ancestral valuations. Rudimentary Kripke models (IV, R, v) where υ is ancestral will be called ancestral Kripke models.
Converse ^4-Heredity and v(±) = 0 imply that, for every rudimentary Kripke model, the relation R is serial, i.e., Vxly(xRy). Analogously, AAncestrality and v(B-^B) = W imply that, for every ancestral Kripke model, R~ι is serial, i.e., Vxly(yRx). So, in ancestral Kripke models, both R and R~ι must be serial.
We need not assume anything besides the seriality of R and R~ι for frames of ancestral Kripke models. If, in < W\ R\ υ') of the proof above, we omit Wγ from W\ and hence also R x from R' and v\ (A) from v'(A), we obtain another nonreflexive rudimentary Kripke model, but this rudimentary Kripke model is not ancestral.
It follows easily from results in [2] , §1 that if is strongly sound and complete with respect to ancestral Kripke models. Let Γ \-A mean as usual that there is a proof of A in H from hypotheses in Γ, i.e., there is a sequence of formulas terminating with A, each of which is either in Γ, or a theorem of //, or obtained by modus ponens from formulas preceding it in the sequence. Then our strong soundness and completeness may be stated as follows:
Proposition 3
For every T QL and every A EL:
where (W, R, v) ranges over ancestral Kripke models.
For soundness, we just use the fact that every ancestral Kripke model is a rudimentary Kripke model, and, for completeness, the fact that every ordinary quasi-ordered Kripke model is an ancestral Kripke model. Of course, this strong soundness and completeness imply the ordinary soundness and completeness of //with respect to ancestral Kripke models; namely, A is provable in //iff A holds in every ancestral Kripke model. Proposition 2 guarantees that, for //, we can also prove strong soundness and completeness, in both senses of Proposition 3, as well as ordinary soundness and completeness, with respect to ancestral Kripke models that are neither reflexive nor transitive (the proof of Proposition 7 of [2] guarantees the same with respect to rudimentary Kripke models that are neither reflexive nor transitive).
Inductive ancestral Kripke models
In the third section of [2] , we have investigated the maximal class of frames such that for every pseudo-valuation υ the conjunction of the conditions: These operations resemble a closure and interior operation respectively, since they satisfy:
ci ω x u ci ω r c ci ω (x u r), int ω (^ n Y) c i n t ω * n int ω r. It is easy to show that:
Cone X is the least hereditary superset of X;
Cl ω X is the least conversely hereditary superset of X (the second assertion is proved in Proposition 16 of [2] ). So, ΛMs hereditary iff X = Cone^f, and X is conversely hereditary iff X -Cl ω X. For Int ω , we can prove the following:
Proposition 4
The set Int ω X is the greatest ancestral subset of X.
Proof: To show that Int ω X is ancestral, suppose y G Int ω X Then there is a Y G ω"( y) such that ycJandazGΓ such that zRy. The set obtained from Y by rejecting y is an ω~-chain from z included in X\ i.e., z G Int ω X To show that Int ω Jf is the greatest ancestral subset of X, suppose Y is ancestral, Y^X, and y E Y. Then, by repeatedly using the ancestrality of Y, we obtain a Zi such that Z\Ry and Zi E Γ, a Z2 such that Z2^Zi and Zi G 7, etc. The set of all these z Λ 's makes an ω~-chain from y included in X. So, y G Int ω X As a corollary of this proposition, we obtain that X is ancestral iff X = Int ω X It is easy to check that -Q,ox& inυ -X = [x: vy(xR*y => y G X)} 9 and that -Cone /Λy -, which is an interior operation, satisfies:
-Cone /Λl , -X is the greatest hereditary subset of X.
So, Cone is analogous to Cl ω and -Cone,,^-to Int ω . Hereditary sets may be characterized either as sets X such that X = Cone X or, alternatively, as sets X such that X = -Cone^ -X. However, an operation that applied to X would give the greatest conversely hereditary subset of X need not exist, as the following counterexample shows. Let W -{a,b,c,d\ and R = {<#,#>,<#,6>,<ό,c>, <&,d),(c,c) 9 = [b, c, d}) . Analogously, an operation that applied to X would give the least ancestral superset of X need not exist. A counterexample is obtained by taking the frame of the previous counterexample with R inverted, i.e., W = {α,6,c,rf} andi? = {(a,a),(b,a),(c,b),(d 9 b),(c,c),<d,d) That the conjunction of (al), (a2), and (a3) implies (a) is shown by induction on the complexity of A. Note that the following conditions are satisfied for every frame < W, R) and every X, Y <Ξ W: (a3) Vxly(xRy), i.e., R is serial.
Condition (al), called prototransitiυity in [2] , follows from transitivity (let t be z), but not the other way around. Condition (a2), calledprotoreflexivity in [2] , follows from reflexivity (let y be x), but not the other way around (the intuitive meaning of these conditions is explained in more detail in [2] ). Now, we can prove the following analog of Proposition 6:
Proposition 7
The condition: The analogy of (bl) with (al) is obvious; (bl) also follows from transitivity (let t be z), but not the other way around. Similarly, (b2) is analogous to (a2); (b2) also follows from reflexivity (let y be x), but not the other way around. By definition, (b3) may be written as:
When we instantiate X and Y by the same set, it is clear that (b3) implies that Vxlz(zRx), i.e. that R~x is serial. When we instantiate X by JFand Y by 0, then (b3) implies that Vxly(xRy), i.e. that R is serial. These considerations show that the assumptions of reflexivity and transitivity for ordinary Kripke models do not function in exactly the same manner. Transitivity secures (al) and (bl), and is tied to implication. Reflexivity secures (a2) and (b2), and is hence tied to disjunction and conjunction, but it also secures (a3) and (b3), and is hence also tied to ± and implication. Reflexivity also secures at one stroke Converse A -Heredity and ^4-Ancestrality. With reflexivity, we have reduced assumptions about valuations to an assumption about frames, which does not mention valuations.
The strong soundness and completeness of H with respect to inductive ancestral Kripke models is an easy consequence of Proposition 3 and the fact that ordinary quasi-ordered Kripke models are inductive ancestral Kripke models.
Nonhereditary Kripke models
In [2] and [3] , and the previous sections of this paper, we have Kripke-style models for //that differ from ordinary quasiordered Kripke models only in the conditions concerning frames. The conditions of Converse A -Heredity and ^4-Ancestrality, which we assumed for valuations in addition to ^-Heredity, are satisfied in ordinary Kripke models, because the frames of these models are reflexive. Since the conditions for valuations concerning connectives, which we have stated in the definition of pseudo-valuation, do not differ from the standard conditions, we may say that we have not altered the conditions for valuations. In this section, we shall consider Kripke-style models for //where conditions for frames need not be changed, i.e., these frames may be quasi-ordered, but conditions for valuations will be changed. We want to show that there are such Kripke-style models where none of the heredity conditions, A -Heredity, Converse A -Heredity, and ^4-Ancestrality, need be satisfied. This will be achieved at the cost of changing also the conditions for valuations concerning connectives. We shall find these Kripke-style models by considering some particular embeddings of //into the modal logic SA (the ordinary Kripke models for //are inspired by another such embedding; see [9] , p. 92). So, we shall first introduce these embeddings.
Let us enlarge our propositional language with the unary connective D, and let LD be the set of all formulas of this enlarged language. The modal logic SA in LD is axiomatized by adding to our axiomatization of//the following axiomschemata:
and the primitive rule of necessitation (i.e., from A, infer ΠA). Consider now the translations (i.e. one-one mappings) t and s from L into LD defined by the following inductive clauses:
t(A-^B) = Πt(A)-+Πt(B), s(A^B) = Πs(A)->s(B) 9 t(AΛB) = Πt(A)ΛΠt(B), S(AΛB) = S(A)ΛS{B) 9 t(AvB)
The translation t prefixes D to every proper subformula of a formula of L, and s resembles a translation considered in ( [7] , IV, §5.1) for embedding intuitionistic logic into linear logic (the translation related to ordinary Kripke models for H prefixes D to propositional variables and implications; cf., for example, [6] , Chap. 3, §7). In order to connect the translations t and s, we will use the following theorems of 54:
Π(ΠAΛΠB)++Π(AΛB).
Note that (1) and the rule converse to necessitation (i.e., from ΠA, infer A) may replace ΠA -• A and ΠA -• ΠΠA in the axiomatization of S4. We can prove by induction on the complexity of A that, for every A:
is a theorem of S4. In the induction step, we use (1) when A is of the form B -• C, and (2) when A is of the form BΛC. Then we can easily establish the following proposition:
Proposition 8 For every A E L:
A is provable in H^t(A) is provable in S4,
<&s(A) is provable in 54.
Proof: Note that Πt(A) is the result of prefixing D to every subformula of A. It is well-known that A is provable in //iff Πt(A) is provable in 54. By (3), we have that A is provable in //iff Πs(A) is provable in S4. Then we use the fact that 54 is closed under necessitation and the rule converse to necessitation.
Next, to fix notation and terminology, we introduce as follows the standard Kripke modelling of 54. A modal Kripke model for 54 is a triple < W, R, v) where (W,R) is a quasi-ordered frame and v:LΠ -+ PWsatisfies:
Vy(xRy^>ye v(A))}.
As before, A holds in (W,R, v) iff v(A) = W.
Let Γ h 54 A mean that there is a proof of A in 54 from hypotheses in Γ without necessitation, i.e., there is a sequence of formulas terminating with A each of which is either in Γ, or a theorem of 54, or obtained by modus ponens from formulas preceding it in the sequence; and let Γ II-54 A mean that there is a proof of A in S4 from hypotheses in Γ with necessitation, i.e., there is a sequence of formulas terminating with A each of which is either in Γ, or a theorem of SA 9 or obtained by modus ponens or necessitation from formulas preceding it in the sequence. Next, let DΓ = {DC: C E Γ}. It is easy to establish the following equivalence: (4) Γlh 54 -4^ΠΓ \-S4 A.
We need this equivalence to prove the second of the following two strong soundness and completeness propositions (for the proof of these propositions, we rely on standard notions of modal logic, like the notions of canonical model and generated submodel; see, for example, [8] ):
Proposition 9
For every T ^ LΠ and every A E LΏ:
where (W 9 R 9 v) ranges over modal Kripke models for S4.
Proof: (Soundness) We use the fact that, for [-54, we have the deduction theorem; i.e., ΓU(Cj \~S4 B implies Γ \-S4 C-+B.
(Completeness) We can infer from not Γ \- S4 A that Γ U {-*A} can be extended to a maximal consistent set Γ'. In the canonical model,
Proposition 10
For every ΓclQ and every A E LΠ:
Γ\\-S4 A& (*) for every (W 9 R 9 v) 9 We can now strengthen Proposition 8. Namely, if Γ h A means, as in the first section, that there is a proof of A in H from hypotheses in Γ, and if t(Γ) = {t(C):CeT} and5 (Γ) = {s(C):CeΓ} 9 then we can prove:
Proposition 11
For every Γ ci and every A E L:
<*S(T)\\S4S(A).
Proof: To establish the third equivalence, we use Proposition 8 and the fact that, for both h and h 54 , we have the deduction theorem. Then we obtain the remaining equivalences by applying (3) and (4).
It follows easily that, for every Γcl and every A E L: and a £ v(q) (cf. the remark after the proof of Proposition 11, and Proposition 9).
t(T)\-s4t(A)*Γ\-A, s(T)\-S4 s(A)=>Γ\-
The following algebraic fact stands behind this failure of strong soundness and completeness with respect to (**). In an arbitrary frame, let X -+ s Fbe an abbreviation for Cone . This means that -> s is not the residual of Π, and that we cannot use it to get the relative pseudo-complement of a Heyting algebra where Π is the meet operation. On the other hand, in [2] , it is explained how the binary operation -+ R involved in (v-+) makes the relative pseudo-complement of a Heyting algebra of hereditary and conversely hereditary sets where Π is the meet operation. In the context of ancestral Kripke models, we have the following analogous fact. For every frame (W 9 R) and every nonempty set A of hereditary and ancestral subsets of JFclosed under -> R and Π, for every X 9 Y,ZEA, we have:
XΠ YQZ&XQ Y-+ R Z.
When we verify this equivalence from left to right, we use the assumption that Xis hereditary. For the other direction, we first establish that WE. A (there is a VinA and V-+ R V -W\ since W\% ancestral, R~ι must be serial). Then we use the assumption that Y is hereditary and W -> R Z ancestral (cf. the proof of Proposition 1).
The frames of nonhereditary Kripke models must be quasi-ordered. This can be inferred from the fact that S4 is the weakest normal modal logic in which H can be embedded by s. Namely, s(p -*/?) is Πp -*p, and, for every normal mo- With this alternative notion of nonhereditary Kripke model based on quasiordered frames, we could rewrite most of this section with essentially the same results.
If we replace (v s -+) and (VA) by (t;,->) and (V ( A), we can introduce a further change in our notion of nonhereditary Kripke model by rejecting the assumption that the frames of these models are quasi-ordered. Instead, for these frames, we assume only R 2 = R, i.e.:
Vx 9 y(xR 2 y^xRy),
which is transitivity and its converse, called weak density. Then we can still prove (0), i.e. the ordinary soundness and completeness of//with respect to these new nonhereditary Kripke models. This can be inferred from the fact that the weakest normal modal logic in which H can be embedded by t is obtained from our axiomatization of 54 by replacing ΠA ->A by ΠΠA -+ ΠA (this system is called Kt'° in [1] , and the translation t is there called t'\ note that, here, ± is primitive and -i defined). The necessity of UUA++ UA is inferred from the presence of ((B-+B)-+A) ++A in//. Actually, for proving the necessity of R 2 = R, it does not matter whether we take (VA) or (I^A) as our condition for conjunction. (Note, by the way, that, in a normal modal logic with UUA ++ UA, we can prove D(UA A UB) ++ U (A AB).) It equally does not matter whether, with (t/ 5 ->) instead of (v t ->), we assume (VA) or (v t A). Reflexivity and transitivity are necessary in either case. So, the change hinges only on implication.
However, we cannot prove the strong soundness and completeness of H with respect to nonhereditary Kripke models with (v t^> ) and (IVΛ) based on frames that must satisfy only R 2 = R. A counterexample is obtained by taking W= {a,b} 9 R = {<tf,&>,<&,&>}, v(p) = W 9 and v(q) = {b}. It is clear that R 2 = R and, by (v t -+), we obtain v(p -> q) = W. Since, of course, we have {p>p-*q} I" Q> strong soundness with respect to (*), and a fortiori (**), must fail.
